European Law – The lis pendens provisions of the Brussels Convention and anti-suit injunctions by Terry, Jeffrey
European Law
The lis pendens provisions of the Brussels Convention and anti-suit
injunctions
Jeffrey Terry
In BNFL v Comex SA (1998), 
(unreported, 9 March 1998) HHJ 
Thornton QC, Official Referee, was 
called upon to grant an anti-suit 
injunction to restrain a French company 
from litigating a suit against an English 
defendant before the Tribunal de 
Commerce de Marseilles (TCM); he did 
not shrink from the task. The case 
highlighted both the principles upon 
which an anti-suit injunction will be 
granted and the operation of the 'lis 
pendens' provisio'ns in art. 21 and 22 of 
the Brussels Convention.
The aim of this paper is to examine, 
through a discussion of the BNFL case,o '
the sort of procedural issues which are 
likely to occur when parallel proceedings 
are being litigated in convention states 
and to discuss, in particular, the 
operation of art. 2 1 and 22 as this is to be 
understood in the wake of this decision 
and the recent decisions of the House of 
Lords and the Court of Appeal in Sarrio v 
Kuwait Investment Authority [1998] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 129 and The Happy Fellow 
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 13 respectively.
THE BNFL CASE
The background facts in the BNFL case 
may be shortly stated: the procedural 
manoeuvrings rather less so. The English 
subsidiary of Comex SA (CNSL) agreed 
to manufacture equipment for BNFL 
under what may conveniently be 
described as the first agreement. Its 
obligations were guaranteed by the 
French parent (SA). Following delivery,
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an issue arose as to whether the 
equipment was built to specification and 
suitable for its purpose. Under a distinct 
agreement (the second agreement) SA 
agreed to take the equipment back to 
Marseilles for tests in order to determine 
whether the contentions of BNFL were 
well-founded or not. Under the second 
agreement, SA was to bear the cost of 
dismantling, testing and transportation if 
BNFL's contentions \vere well-founded: 
BNFL was to bear the cost if not. Perhaps 
predictably, the parties were still unable 
to agree on whether the machine was 
built to specification and suitable for its 
purpose, even after the further tests in 
Marseilles.
BNFL initially suggested arbitration to 
resolve the matters in dispute pursuant to 
an arbitration clause in the first 
agreement but the English solicitors, first 
instructed on behalf of both CNSL and 
SA, contended that the Official Referee's 
Court in London would be the 
appropriate forum and BNFL 
accordingly commenced proceedings 
against both CNSL and SA before the 
Official Referee in June 1997. SA then 
changed its solicitors and the new 
solicitors challenged the jurisdiction of 
the English courts, contending that:o ' o
  SA was domiciled in France;
  that the guarantee pursuant to which 
SA was sued was 
governed by 
French law under 
the Rome 
Convention; and
  that the place of 
performance of 
the guarantee was in France.
It was, by this stage, apparent that 
CNSL would be financially unable to 
honour such obligations as it might be 
found to have to BNFL and that BNFL's 
only effective remedy was likely to be 
against SA under the guarantee.
Following the issue of its summons 
seeking a declaration in England that the 
correct venue for proceedings against SA 
under the Brussels Convention was in
France, but before its determination, SA 
commenced its own proceedings to 
recover the costs incurred under the 
second agreement before the TCM. 
BNFL then issued an application before 
the TCM under art. 2 1 and/or 22 of the 
Brussels Convention inviting it to decline 
jurisdiction and/or to stay the French 
proceedings pending determination of 
the English proceedings. Thus began a 
series of 'leapfrog' hearings before the 
courts of two different states as the 
parties sought to have the merits 
determined before the courts of the state 
of their choice.
The first matter to reach a hearing, in 
December 1997, was SA's application to 
the Official Referee for a declaration that 
the English court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the claim against SA. 
That matter was resolved fairly shortly in 
BNFL's favour. The judge took the view 
that, whatever the position might 
otherwise have been, the exchanges 
between the solicitors prior to 
commencement of the English 
proceedings, in which SA had then taken 
the stance that the matter should be 
determined before the Official Referee 
rather than referred to arbitration, 
amounted to an agreement to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the English courts. SA's 
summons was dismissed accordingly.
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That, however, wras far from being an 
end of the matter. SA continued to press 
the French proceedings and issued a 
further summons in England contendingo o
that the English proceedings should be 
stayed under art. 21 of the Brussels 
Convention. Put shortly, SA contended 
that, by the defence which it served in 
England, following the ruling that the 
English court had jurisdiction, it had 
raised the same issues as were already the 
subject of the French proceedings. The 21
TCM was, therefore, first seised of what 
were described as the 'Marseilles issues' 
and the English court should defer to theo
French court accordingly since resolution 
of these issues would largely, if not 
completely, determine the outcome of 
the English proceedings brought under 
the first agreement and the guarantee.
The second hearing took place before 
the TCM in January 1998: judgment was 
delivered on 19 February 1998. On the 
hearing of BNFL's application objecting 
to the jurisdiction of the French courts 
and/or contending that there should be a 
stay, the TCM took the line that it would 
defer any decision on jurisdiction until 
the parties had filed submissions on the 
merits. It adjourned to 3 March 1998 for 
this to be done.
In the meantime the scene shifted back 
to England. On 20 February, the day 
after delivery of the French judgment, 
SA's application to stay the English 
proceedings pending determination of 
the French proceedings came on for 
hearing. The matter was adjourned part- 
heard to 26 February and, during the 
adjournment, concerned that the 
approach of the French Court would 
result in large costs being incurred in 
filing submissions on the merits in 
France, BNFE sought an anti-suit 
injunction restraining SA from 
continuing with the French proceedings. 
This fell to be heard at the same time as 
the adjourned hearing of SA's summons 
on 26 February.
Before considering how the court dealt 
with these matters, it is instructive to 
consider the lis pendens provisions of the 
Brussels Convention generally.
SAME CAUSE OF ACTION - 
SAME PARTIES
Article 21 provides that, where 
proceedings involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different 
contracting states, any court other than
O J
the court first seised shall of its own 
motion stay its proceedings until such 
time as the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised is established. Where the 
jurisdiction of the court first seised is 
established, any court other than the 
court first seised shall decline jurisdiction 
in favour of that court.
Article 21 is designed to prevent the 
possibility of inconsistent verdicts 'in so 
far as possible and from the outset' 
(Gubisch v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861;)
and 'must be interpreted broadly so as to 
cover, in principle, all situations of lis 
pendens before courts in contracting 
states' (Overseas Union Ins v New Hampshire 
Ins [1991] ECR 1-3317) .
The phrase 'same cause of action' is 
construed broadly and in an autonomous 
sense. It does not mean what a common 
lawyer would naturally understand it to 
mean. Thus, where a seller commenced 
proceedings in Germany for the unpaid 
purchase price of goods and the buyer 
commenced proceedings in Italy for 
rescission of the contract of sale, art. 21 
was held to apply on the basis that the 
'cause of action' was the same contractual 
relationship (Gubisch v Palumbo). Similarly, 
a claim by an insured in France for 
payment was held to be the same cause of 
action as a claim by the insurer for a 
declaration of non-liability brought in 
England (Overseas Union Ins v New 
Hampshire Ins).
The English text speaks only of the 
'same cause of action': the French of the 
same 'cause' and 'objet 1 . The German text, 
like the English, does not differentiateo
between the terms 'cause of action' and 
'object' or 'subject matter' but it has 
been held that:
'it must be construed in the same manner 
as the other language versions which make 
that distinction. '(Gubisch v Palumbo)
So must the English text. This was made 
clear in The Tatry [1994] ECR I-S439 
where the ECJ expressed the view that:
  The 'cause of action' comprises the facts 
and the rule of law relied on as the 
basis of the action; and
  The 'object of the action' means the end 
the action has in view (the Court of 
Appeal applied this double test of 
'cause' and 'objet' in The Happy Fellow 
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 13, at p. 17, col. 
2).
Even if art. 21 applies and the English 
court is second seised, art. 21 will be 
overridden by art. 17 if there is an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
conferring jurisdiction on the English 
courts (Continental Bank v Aeakos [1994] 1 
WLR 588; Banque Cantonale v Waterlily 
[1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 346).
RELATED ACTIONS
Article 22 provides that, where related 
actions are brought in the courts of 
different contracting states, any court 
other than the court first seised may, 
while the actions are pending at first1 o
instance, stay its proceedings. A court
other than the court first seised may also, 
on the application of one of the parties, 
decline jurisdiction if the law of that 
court permits the consolidation of 
related actions and the court first seised 
has jurisdiction over both actions.
For the purposes of art. 22, actions are 
deemed to be related where they are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to 
hear and determine them together to 
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings.
The scope of art. 22 has been recently 
considered by both the House of Lords 
and the Court of Appeal in Sarrio v Kuwait 
Investment Authority [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
129 and The Happy Fellow.
CONFUSION
In The Happy Fellow Saville L] observed: 
'Article 21 is concerned with proceedings
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and Article 22 with actions'. The difference 
between these is not entirely clear. In BNFL 
v Comex, HH] Thornton QC expressed the 
view that 'proceedings' is intended to be a 
narrower concept than 'actions' but was not 
required to consider the' difference between 
the two concepts.
Sarrio is instructive both as to the 
relationship between art. 21 and art. 22 
and also as to the broad scope of art. 22. 
The Court of Appeal had taken a 
restrictive view of art. 22 holding that it 
was necessary to differentiate between 
the primary issues, which were those 
necessary to establish a cause of action 
and other, secondary issues; it was only if 
the two actions overlapped on the 
primary issues that a risk of 
irreconcilable judgements arose. The 
House of Lords decisively rejected this 
view, Lord Saville stating:
'The actions, to be related, must be so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk 
of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings. To my mind these wide 
words are designed to cover a range of 
circumstances, from cases where the matters 
before the courts are virtually identical 
(though not falling within the provisions of 
Article 21) to cases where, although this is 
not the position, the connection is close 
enough to make it expedient for them to be 
heard and determined together to avoid the 
risk in question ...I take the view that to 
attempt to analyse actions so as to distinguish 
between different kinds of issues would be 
likely to add to the complexity of applications 
under Article 22 and thus to the expense and 
delay in dealing with them ... For these
reasons, I am of the view that there should be 
a broad common sense approach to the 
question whether the actions in question are 
related, bearing in mind the objective of the 
article, applying the simple wide test set out in 
Article 22 and refraining from an over 
sophisticated analysis of the matter.'
WHEN IS A COURT 
SEISED?
It is clearly important for the operation 
of both art. 21 and 22 to know when a 
court is 'seised'. Both articles proceed on 
the basis that one court will be first seised 
and another second seised.
In The Happy Fellow 
observed:
Saville L J
'Article 2 1 is concerned with proceedings 
and Article 22 with actions. The questions are 
whether the proceedings involve the same cause 
or object or whether the actions are related. It 
is thus a misreading of the Convention to ask 
which Court is first seised of issues which are 
or might be raised within the proceedings or 
actions. If such were the case, then the articles 
would achieve precisely the opposite of their 
intended purpose, which is to achieve the 
proper administration of justice within the 
community, since the courts of one country 
would have to decline jurisdiction in respect of 
some issues and the courts of another country 
in respect of others, a recipe not merely 
calculated to produce irreconcilable judgements 
but also to encourage the multiplicity of 
proceedings in different countries of the
community'j
Accordingly it is suggested that the 
correct approach is to focus on when the 
relevant sets of proceedings or actions 
were commenced. In order to do this 
one must apply the relevant national law 
in order to decide when the proceedings 
became 'definitively pending' (Zelger v 
Salinitri (No 2) [1984] ECR 2397). In 
England the English court is seised for 
this purpose on service of the writ but 
not before (The Sargasso [1994] 3 All ER 
180).
RESOLUTION OF THE 
POSITION IN BNFL V 
COMEX SA
Applying the broad European concept 
of a 'cause of action' for the purposes of 
art. 21, the court concluded that the 
causes of action in England and France 
were the same, notwithstanding that, ino
England, BNFL was suing on the first 
agreement and the guarantee and, in 
France, SA was suing on the second 
agreement.
Accordingly, it became necessary to 
determine which court was the first 
seised for the purposes of the lis pendens 
provisions. HHJ Thornton QC held that 
the 'issue-orientated' approach urged by 
SA, separating out the Marseilles issue 
and contending that it was first raised in 
France was not permissible in the light of 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in 
the Happy Fellow and the House of Eords 
in Sarrio. A simple 'tie-break' approach of 
which proceedings were commenced 
first was all that was called for. Since the 
English proceedings had started first 
chronologically, the English courts were 
the first seised for the purposes of art. 
21. Accordingly the English court was 
entitled to proceed and the onus was on 
the TCM to decline jurisdiction.
Given the stated intention of the TCM 
to proceed to consider jurisdiction 
following submissions on the merits, 
however, ought the court to interfere by 
the grant of an anti-suit injunction? The 
key to this part of the problem lay in the 
court's earlier holding that there had 
been an exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
for the purposes of art. 17 by the earlier 
invitation of SA, accepted bv BNFL, to 
proceed before the 
official referee. 
Applying the 
decision of the 
Court of Appeal in 
Continental Bank v 
Aeakos, HHJ 
Thornton held that, 
even if the English courts had been 
second seised for the purposes of art. 21, 
the prima facie effect of this would be 
overridden by the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement and that, where the parties 
had reached such an agreement, it was 
appropriate that the party intending to 
proceed in a different jurisdiction in 
breach of the agreement should be 
restrained by injunction from doing so.
The court was not deterred from the 
grant of the injunction by considerations 
of comity and fear of offending the TCM. 
It was SA which was to be restrained not 
the French court. HHJ Thornton 
expressed the view that:
'There are no, or only slight, considerations 
of comity when a defendant initiates 
proceedings in France in clear breach of an 
Article 1 7 agreement that has only just been 
entered into and which had been the basis of 
the plaintiff initiating the earlier English 
proceedings in thejirst place'.
CONCLUSION
It is suggested, with all due respect to 
the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseilles, 
that its decision to defer any ruling onJ o
jurisdiction until alter the filing of 
submissions on the merits led to 
considerable unnecessary expense for the 
parties and failed to apply the 
fundamental principles of the Brussels 
Convention, which are designed too
prevent multiplicity of proceedings in 
different contracting states.
Armed with only the same material, 
the English court had no difficulty in 
determining that art. 2 1 applied and that 
the English court was first seised. If, 
instead of deferring its decision, the 
TCM had so ruled in January 1998 and 
declined jurisdiction in favour of the 
English court, which was already seised of 
the issues (or, at least, stayed the French 
proceedings until after the English action 
had been concluded under art. 22 so as 
to avoid any risk of conflicting 
judgments), none of the later procedural 
wrangling would have been necessary and 
the English court would not have been 
called upon to take the extreme step of 
granting an anti-suit injunction.
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For the convention to work properly, 
the courts of the contracting states must
O
be astute to prevent multiplicity of 
proceedings and be ready to concede 
jurisdiction in favour of the courts of 
another contracting state in which 
proceedings have already started, without 
delay. If the courts of a contracting state 
fail to do this, they are not only doing the 
litigants a disservice but are failing to act 
in accordance with the international 
treaty obligations imposed by the 
convention. If the treaty obligations are 
swiftly and effectively observed, the need 
to risk jeopardising the comity of nations 
by the grant of anti-suit injunctions in 
one contracting state preventing the 
continuance of proceedings in another 
should rarely, if ever, arise.  
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